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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Respondents,

v.
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING
PANY, a corporation,

Case No.

8351
COM-

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The disagreement between the respective parties' statement of facts is negligible, and the additional facts stated
by respondents are without legal consequence.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
Respondents agree that Sprague did not remove any
rock from the quarry until May 7, although all of the rock
exposed in the quarry by the explosion of February 3, was
reduced to contract size by appellant as early as February
23. They do not question appellant's authorities which
demonstrate that this admitted breach of Sprague's covenants precludes respondents from recovering any damages
on account of the delay in the performance of his prime
contract.
Respondents attach no legal significance whatever to
their failure to furnish appellant compressed air after the
Bergraph 315 compressor broke down and was removed
from the quarry on September 21. This breach goes to the
very heart of the subcontract, because it stopped completely
all of defendant's operations in the quarry. We are aware
that the small LeRoi compressor was available, but it was
virtually useless to the defendant at that time (R. 370).
It could be used only to operate one small drill for secondary breaking (R. 370). As it was necessary to do primary
rock breaking at that time, the failure to furnish a compressor of the capacity of the Bergraph 315 put an end to
the production of rock in the quarry (R. 367-8).
Although respondents' counsel ignore this glaring default, their superintendent was fully aware of its significance. We again refer to his testimony at pages 411, 412
and 414 of the record where he indicates the critical situation caused by the breakdown of the 315 compressor and
describes his persistent and far-flung efforts to replace it.
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Appellant's contention that Sprague's failure to remove
the contract size rock from the quarry with any degree
of promptness and to furnish compressed air following the
breakdown of the Bergraph compressor precludes any recovery by respondents and gives rise to a cause of action
in favor of appellant remains unchallenged, except for the
bald assertion that appellant did not break the rock in the
manner or within the time provided for in the contract.
Respondents appear to be under the impression that appellant was to break the full amount of rock required by the
contract into the size therein specified by either a single
explosion or by carving chunks of contract size rock out of
the wall of the quarry. That the parties did not contemplate
any such operation is demonstrated by the fact that they
expressly provided in the contract for secondary breaking
of rock.
We cannot determine from respondents' brief whether
they contend that the contract required appellant to deliver
the contract size rocks into trucks at the mouth of the
quarry, or to furnish respondents a traxcavator, a dragline,
a tractor, and a shovel for that purpose. Perhaps both contentions are made. Neither of them can be maintained. The
full extent of work required of appellant by the contract
was to break into specified sizes in the quarry the native
rock constituting the walls of the quarry. It did not agree
to furnish any equipment or machinery of any kind or
character. It did not agree to do any sorting, loading, moving, hauling or delivering.
Since it is conceded by respondents that no contract
size rock was removed from the quarry until the middle
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of May, it is immaterial whether they are correct in stating
that all acceptable rock was removed from the quarry in
that month. However, such is not the fact. According to
the records maintained by the Government and by Mrs.
Sprague and the testimony of respondents' superintendent
(R. 117), a large amount of contract size rock broken in
February was not removed from the quarry until the last
two or three days of July and the first two or three days
of August.
It is true that respondents did some secondary breaking
of rock in the latter part of July and the early part of
August. They are in error in charging the cost of this
work against appellant. The work was done after appellant abandoned the contract in the latter part of April or
first of May. Being legally justified in stopping performance, appellant was under no obligation to resume performance. It resumed the production of rock only after receiving the payment due April 20, and being assured by United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company that it would assume
the obligations of Sprague under the contract. Whatever
work respondents did in the way of breaking rock in the
quarry after appellant left the quarry in the latter part of
April and before it resumed breaking the rock in August
is not chargeable against appellant.

An additional fact justifying the appellant in quitting
the quarry in the latter part of April was the failure of
Sprague to make the payment due on the 20th of that
month. On page 17 of their brief, respondents admit that
the amount due appellant on April 20, was $4392.00.
Sprague's surety finally paid the installment on July 26,
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using the payment as a means of inducing appellant to
resume the breaking of rock.
Respondents attempt to minimize their breach of the
covenant to furnish sufficient compressed air to operate
defendant's drills efficiently by pointing out that appellant did not request Sprague to furnish a man to start the
compressor and that Sprague did not refuse to take steps to
have the compressor repaired when needed. While the
contract, in our opinion, clearly required Sprague to supply
an operator to start the compressors and keep them running,
appellant does not claim any damages or that it was justified in stopping work in the quarry on either the last of
April or the 5th of October, because of the failure to furnish such operator. Neither does the appellant contend
that Sprague ever refused to repair any compressor. It is
clear, however, from the testimony of his partner wife
that he did not consider that he was under any duty to
furnish appellant with compressed air except for a brief
period at the outset of the operations (See R. 147-8).
Respondents admit "there was some difficulty about
compressed air." vVe construe this admission to mean that
while there was a breach of the covenant to furnish compressed air, the breach was not so material as to justify
the appellant in failing to break the full amount of rock
specified by the contract, but can be adequately compensated
by an award of damages. We agree that for the breach of
the covenant to furnish compressed air up to the latter part
of April, an award of damages would be an adequate remedy. \Ve cannot agree, however, that respondents' failure
to furnish appellant sufficient compressed air to operate
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its drills efficiently after the Bergraph compressor broke
down on September 21, was not a sufficiently material
breach to justify the appellant abandoning the contract
on October 5, or that an award of damages would alone be
an adequate remedy.
When the Bergraph compressor broke down on September 21, appellant's operations had reached the point
where it was necessary to do additional primary breaking
of rock. The small LeRoi compressor was useless for the
purpose of drilling the holes required to do the primary
breaking. As a matter of fact, it would operate only one
small jack hammer and that inefficiently. Without a compressor of the capacity of the Bergraph 315, all rock breaking operations in the quarry were at a complete standstill.
It was impossible to break the rock without drills, and it
was impossible to operate the drills without an air compressor. Appellant's men ~nd equipment stood by idle in
the quarry for more than two weeks while respondents'
superintendent spent "hours and hours and hours" on the
telephone contacting "every equipment house and contractor, or anybody who I thought might have a compressor
or know of a compressor throughout the state and two surrounding states." Under these circumstances, the question
whether respondents' breach of the covenant to furnish
compressed air after September 21, was substantial enough
to justify defendant in abandoning the work is not open
to debate.
Respondents' citation from Restatement of the Law of
Contracts sets forth certain considerations for determining
whether a failure to perform a contract is so material as to
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relieve the other party from performance of a corresponding promise. Applying those considerations to the case at
bar requires a holding that appellant was relieved of the
duty of breaking the specified amount of rock by the failure
of respondents to furnish it with compressed air as provided
in the contract.
POINT II.
Respondents make no complaint whatever of the ruling
of the trial court sustaining appellant's objection to their
offer of proof of what respondents refer to as the proper
method of producing rock in this quarry.
The ruling is not complained of, because it was obviously correct. In neither the complaint, the amended
complaint in Case No. 96365, nor in the complaint in the
present case did plaintiffs even suggest or intimate that
appellant broke the rock in an unworkmanlike manner.
There was no pretrial order enlarging the issues raised by
the pleadings. The trial court correctly rejected the appellant's offer of proof, because there was no issue raised by
the pleadings to which it was material.
Furthermore, what respondents offered to prove were
certain theories that by drilling holes on the top of the
wall of the quarry the rock could be broken to contract size
without secondary breaking. This theory was exploded by
respondents themselves. After appellant left the quarry,
they drilled holes on the top of the quarry by a wagon drill
(an oversized jack hammer R. 133). That the rock broken
in this manner had to be rebroken by secondary blasting
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is demonstrated by the testimony of their superintendent
at R. 128-129.
Notwithstanding the assertion of respondents' counsel
to the contrary, ·appellant did some primary breaking by
drilling the holes from the top of the quarry wall. See R.
367-8.
It must be remembered that the initial explosion broke

several thousand tons of rock from the quarry wall, and
that at the time respondents and appellant did primary
breaking by drilling holes on top of the quarry wall, only
a small amount of rock remained to be broken. It requires
no expert testimony to demonstrate that this method of
primary breaking was slow and tedious compared to the
coyote hole method. We repeat, however, that each method
required secondary breaking.
Respondents' counsel states that the record is full of
testimony to show that appellant did not break the rock in
a workmanlike manner, but he fails to point out any whatsoever. We submit that there is none.

POINT III.
Respondents in effect request this court to vacate so
much of the memorandum decision of the trial court as
determined that the cost to Sprague of breaking the additional rock required to complete the prime contract after
appellant left the quarry was less than the contract required
to be paid appellant. If this could be done, it would simply
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leave the record destitute of a finding essential to support
an award of damages to respondents.
Our contention that the evidence is insufficient to show
that it cost respondents more than the contract price to
produce the additional rock after appellant terminated its
operations, because there is no segregation of the cost of
compressed air is entirely ignored in respondents' brief.
Accordingly, our position in this regard should be taken
as confessed.
Neither do respondents attempt to sustain the ruling
of the trial court admitting in evidence the packages and
bundles marked Exhibits 16-P, 16P-a, 23-P and 23-Pa, other
than to say that they "believe that these exhibits and others
of similar character were * * * properly received in
evidence." No reasons are given for respondents' belief.
No authorities are cited and no exception is taken to appellant's authorities which hold that its objections to those
exhibits were well taken.

POINT IV.
To support the award of $823.15 for so-called increased
cost of loading and hauling rock, respondents rely upon
their Exhibit 31-P. This Exhibit was composed by Mrs.
Sprague, a partner with her husband in the project. The
Exhibit is a completely self-serving document and is without any authenticity or foundation whatsoever. The statement of Mrs. Sprague that it was based upon files and records in her possession can give the instrument no weight
whatever. A person cannot lift himself by his own boot-
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straps. The instrument has no more probative value than
the statement of respondents' counsel in his brief.
Apart from the absence of any evidence to support
the item of damage under consideration, there is no basis
in the contract for imposing upon the appellant any cost
of loading or hauling the rock whether such costs were
increased or decreased. If, as has been demonstrated there
is no evidence that appellant broke the rock in an unworkmanlike manner, it follows that it discharged its entire duty
under the contract by breaking the rock to contract size in
the quarry. The matter of loading and hauling the rock was
the sole concern of the respondents.

POINT V.
Respondents admit that Sprague defaulted in the payment due under the terms of the contract on April 20, and
that under the decisions of this court cited in our main
brief appellant was justified in abandoning the contract.
Since it did abandon the contract on May 1, it follows from
respondents' admissions that appellant is not liable for delay
on the part of Sprague in the performance of his prime
contract. It is, therefore, unnecessary to again refer to
evidence of Sprague's financial collapse, weather conditions,
restrictions upon the use of highways for hauling rock and
the changes in the plans of the levee whereby the revetment
was extended an additional 300 feet (see Exhibit 4-P), all
of which contributed heavily to Sprague's failure to complete the prime project on time.
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It is immaterial whether appellant abandoned the work

on May 1 because of Sprague's failure to make the April
20 payment or because of some other breach of the contract
by him.
Admittedly appellant resumed the work of breaking
the rock after receiving from the Surety Company the
payment of July 26. It did so solely upon the assurance of
the Surety Company that it would comply with all of
Sprague's covenants in the contract. Appellant continued
its operations thereafter until respondents failed to supply
it with compressed air after the Bergraph compressor broke
down on September 21.

POINT VI.
In our opening brief we cited evidence which established that after appellant abandoned the contract about
the first of May, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company induced appellant to resume the work of producing rock in the quarry, and assumed the obligations of
Sprague under the contract, thereby becoming liable primarily for failure to furnish to appellant compressed air
to operate its drills. Respondents in answer to this contention merely assert that the evidence cited does not have
the effect which appellant attached to it. No authorities
are cited by respondents and no exception is taken to those
cited by appellant. We submit that our construction of the
evidence is correct.
We also pointed to the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint in case No. 96365 wherein the United States Fidelity
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& Guaranty Company affirmatively alleged that it became

obligated to perform the contract between Sprague and
Boyles Bros. Drilling Company, and that it did perform
the contract. Respondents counsel pleads a most pathetic
confession of embarrassment for having made these allegations.
Why these allegations should cause counsel any distress
is extremely difficult to comprehend. The allegation that
the Surety Company became obligated to perform the contract is strictly in accord with the facts as disclosed by the
evidence cited in our opening brief. Of course, the allegation that it performed the contract is contrary to the undisputed evidence, but that is in the last analysis a conclusion
of law. Plaintiffs' pleadings are full of similar erroneous
conclusions, and, of course, the same could be said of their
brief.
The allegation that United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company issued its bond for the performance of the contract between Boyles and Sprague, although not strictly
accurate, is not so out of line with the facts as to call for
any apology. It did issue its bond, and that bond was for
the benefit of Boyles Bros., as a supplier of labor which
went into the project covered by the prime contract.
The statement in respondents' brief that the trial court
found that there was no failure to furnish compressed air
is contrary to the record. The trial court made no finding
whatever upon that issue as we have shown under Point
VIII of our brief.
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POINT VII.
Inasmuch as respondents in effect confess error with
respect to the award of $292.80 for rock purchased by them,
there is no occasion to do more than agree with counsel that
this error alone would not require a reversal of the j udgment or the granting of a new trial. But the record in this
case contains numerous other errors which cannot be corrected by a simple order reducing the judgment.

POINT VIII.
To the respondents' inquiry as to what would have been
added by the finding "plaintiff furnished defendant with
compressed air to operate its drills efficiently," the answer
is that there would have been a determination of at least
one of the material issues raised by the pleadings. Of
course, the finding would have been contrary to the undisputed evidence, but it would indicate that the trial court
understood what at least one of the issues were.
Respondents say that when it comes to the breaches
of the contract on the part of the defendant, the findings
are specific and exact. They contend that the memorandum
decision must be regarded as part of the findings of fact.
But if this be allowed, there still is a complete failure to
find upon the material issues raised by the pleadings. In
this connection, it will be remembered that the respondents
repudiated the memorandum decision wherein it was determined that the cost to respondents of producing the rock
after appellant left the quarry on October 5, was less than
the cost under the contract sued upon.
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We agree that the memorandum decision discloses that
the trial court did determine that while there was a breach
of Sprague's covenant to furnish appellant with enough
compressed air to operate its drills efficiently, the breach
was not sufficient to authorize a rescission or cancellation
of the contract. We emphasize again that appellant does
not claim any right to rescind or cancel the contract. It is,
therefore, unnecessry to consider whether the breach of
Sprague's covenants would or would not justify the remedy
of rescission or cancellation.

POINT IX.
The proposition discussed in Point IX of our opening
brief was predicated upon an assumption contrary to the
record that there was some conflict in the evidence with
respect to the issues raised by the pleadings. Since respondents do not seriously contend that any such conflict exists,
the matter discussed in our Point IX has become moot.

POINT X.
Respondents make a very plausible argument to the
effect that they should have been permitted to file their
amended complaint in Case No. 96365. The difficulty confronting respondents is that the argument is untimely. They
have not appealed from the order denying them the right
to file the amended complaint. That order still stands in
full force and effect. It surely must be accorded some legal
force or effect.
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It is amusing of respondents to complain of being
deprived of their day in court. They were in court on their
original complaint, and nothing has occurred to prevent
them from being fully heard in that action. The ruling of
the court refusing to allow them to file the amended complaint did not prevent them from going forward. If the
ruling were erroneous, it could have been corrected by
appeal.
Respondents have been accorded not only their day in
court, but actually have been using two days.
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CONCLUSION

Respondents have not only failed to answer appellant's
objections to the judgment appealed from, but have not
even grappled with the problems. They have ignored the
principles of law inyolved. They agree with the facts as
outlined in appellant's brief and do not point out any additional facts of any legal significance. They admit that the
covenant of Sprague to furnish appellant with sufficient
compressed air to operate its drills efficiently was broken,
that Sprague failed to remove the rock from the quarry
as required by the contract, and that the payment due
appellant was not made until three months late.
A number of errors set out in our brief are either
expressly or impliedly confessed.
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of
appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
for
VANCOTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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